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at a distant location (e.g., with growth of
synapse diameter), quantal size would
not be increased.
Reconciling Evidence for
Presynaptic and Postsynaptic
Involvement in LTP
We now return to the question of whether
the lack of change in potency observed by
Enoki et al. (2009) (Figure 1) indeed rules
out a significant postsynaptic contribution
to LTP. Let us start by supposing that the
EPSPs generated by single CA1 synapses
are uniquantal. The answer is then simple:
LTP could enlarge the synapse by addi-
tion of new release sites presynaptically
and the addition of AMPA channels to
the periphery of an enlarged postsynaptic
specialization (resulting in no change in
AMPAR density). By the logic of Advance
4—that quantal size is determined by
local density of AMPA channels—this
would not change potency. If, on the other
hand, release can be multiquantal, en-
hancing pr would lead to more multiquan-
tal responses; if summation is linear, this
should lead to an increase in potency,
contrary to what is observed. However,
if summation is sublinear, as suggested
by Advance 3, large responses would be
choked off, leading to little change in
potency. In summary, the fact that LTP
does not affect potency is not a definitive
argument against strong postsynaptic
involvement in LTP.
Thenewlyavailabledata fromthepapers
reviewed here provide strong constraints
on models of LTP expression. Readers
interested in a model that deals with many
of these complexities and accounts for
a broad range of findings regarding both
presynaptic and postsynaptic changes
should consult Lisman and Raghavachari
(2006). More constraints will be available
soon as even better methods are applied
to the problem. Specifically, methods that
break the diffraction limit of light micros-
copy may make it possible to directly
visualize where AMPARs are added to
synapses and how synapses grow after
LTP induction. The use of quantum dots
will make it possible to monitor single-
release events before andafter LTP (Zhang
et al., 2009). Buy your tickets now for the
pre/post debate, 2010.
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In this issue of Neuron, Mahon et al. show that the ventral visual cortex of congenitally blind individuals,
who have never experienced the visual world, has an object-category organization similar to that found
in sighted individuals. Here, we discuss the implications of this finding for our understanding of the
‘‘visual’’ cortex.‘‘. if you take men born blind, who
have made use of such [tactile]
sensations all their life, you will find
they feel things with perfect exact-284 Neuron 63, August 13, 2009 ª2009 Elseness that one might almost say
that they see with their hands. ’’
—Descartes (1637; in Gregory
and Wallace, 1963)vier Inc.Visual neuroscience research has pre-
dominantly considered the visual cortex
as a stimulus-driven, unimodal system.
This line of research has revealed
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Previewsa hierarchical organization of visual cortex.
The first stage of cortical processing
consists of neurons tuned to low-level
visual features such as oriented bars.
These neurons feed into subsequent
regions sensitive to increasingly complex
combinations of features such as simple
shapes, which then project to higher-level
visual cortex where neurons responding
selectively to whole objects have been
found. In humans, there is evidence for
distinct regions responding selectively to
images of faces, body parts, and spatial
layouts (Downing et al., 2006). At a coarser
anatomical level, there is a consistent
animate-inanimate organization with ani-
mate objects (e.g., animals, faces) being
represented more laterally than inanimate
objects (e.g., tools, houses) (Chao et al.,
1999). The ontogenyof the functional orga-
nization of visual cortex is under debate,
with some researchers highlighting the
influence of genetics, while others have
focused on the role of visual experience.
However, common to most accounts is
that visual experienceduringcertain critical
periods is necessary for normal functional
organization to develop.
In a study published in this issue of
Neuron, Mahon et al. (2009) provide
convincing evidence for a different view,
by showing a regular animate-inanimate
organization in the visual cortex of individ-
uals that have had no visual experience.
This finding challenges the deep-rooted
notion of the visual cortex as a unimodal
system, molded by visual experience.
Using fMRI, Mahon and colleagues
(2009) tested a group of sighted partici-
pants on two tasks, one involving the
viewing of animate and inanimate objects
and the second involving a task where the
participants listened to the names of these
objects while judging the relative size of
each of them. The same auditory task
was presented to three participants who
wereblind frombirth (congenital blindness)
and thus do not have a representation of
the visual world. In the sighted group, the
authors found a relatively stronger re-
sponse during the viewing of animate
objects in lateral visual regions and during
the viewing of inanimate objects in medial
regions, thereby replicating the previously
established animate-inanimate organiza-
tion of visual cortex (Chao et al., 1999).
Interestingly, this organization was also
evident when the sighted group performedthe auditory task, suggesting that the
spoken words evoked visual representa-
tions of these objects, possibly through
visual imagery. The truly remarkable
finding was that the same animate-inani-
mate organization was also found in the
visual cortex of congenitally blind partici-
pants performing the auditory task.
Contrary to the resultsof thesightedgroup,
this finding cannot be simply explained by
referring to visual imagery or to associa-
tions of the object names with the visual
appearance of the objects. Instead, the
result suggests the activation of nonvisual
object representations and shows that
the large-scale categorical organization of
ventral visual cortex is independent of
visual input and visual experience.
These results raise newquestions about
theoriginsof neural responseproperties in
the visual system, as well as in other
sensory systems. What is represented or
computed in higher-level visual cortex if,
as Mahon and colleagues (2009) show,
visual input is not critical for the functional
organization of this region? Taking this
one step further: how ‘‘visual’’ is visual
cortex?
It is likely that the specific content of the
representations in the visual cortex of
congenitally blind individuals is quite
different from that in sighted individuals.
Nonetheless, the similarity in the categor-
ical organization of higher-order visual
cortex in both groups indicates that this
organization does not critically depend
on visual experience and may be due
to more abstract relationships between
object categories. Although congenitally
blind individuals have hadno visual experi-
ence, they have had extensive experience
with the world through tactile and auditory
signals and have developed increased
sensitivity to these nonvisual signals. This
raises the interesting possibility that high-
level, and perhaps also lower-level, visual
cortex can represent object features and
spatial scene characteristics indepen-
dently of the modality that conveys this
information. In this view, visual cortex is
mostly visual because this is the dominant
modality for spatial information, including
object shape.When vision is lost andother
modalities take over as the primary source
of spatial information, visual cortex may
become more sensitive to the latent input
from these other modalities (e.g., Pasc-
ual-Leone and Hamilton, 2001). EvidenceNeuron 6for this view comes from studies showing
activation in visual cortex when blind indi-
viduals read Braille (Sadato et al., 1996).
Similarly, congenitally blind participants
experiencing tactile flow show activation
in areas that are, in sighted participants,
activated by optic flow (Ricciardi et al.,
2007). These and other studies provide
evidence for the view that computations
in human visual cortex need not be limited
to visual input. Rather, it seems that the
visual system is predisposed to process
certain types of information that are
mostly, but not exclusively, provided by
the eyes. Experiments on the famous
case S.B., a middle-aged man who re-
gained sight after being blind for basically
all his life, further suggest a convergence
of tactile and visual object representations
(Gregory andWallace, 1963). For example,
S.B. had learned to recognize inscribed
upper case lettersby touch.Whenhis sight
was restored he could quickly recognize
upper case letters by sight alone, whereas
he had great difficulty learning to read
lower case letters. He could also draw
objects from memory, including animals
and tools that he had never seen. These
intriguing observations suggest efficient
transfer of information from touch to vision
and dovetail with the surprisingly similar
object-category organization in the visual
cortex of congenitally blind participants
as compared to sighted participants,
described by Mahon and colleagues
(2009).
What could be the root cause of the
animate-inanimate organization of ventral
visual cortex? Most accounts, naturally,
are based on visual properties of object
categories. For example, one proposal is
that the animate-inanimate organization
is related to retinal eccentricity biases
that extend from early visual cortex into
higher-level visual cortex (Malach et al.,
2002). The argument is that animate
objects, such as faces, require a detailed
representation inorder tobediscriminated
and are thus represented in the foveal
(lateral) part of visual cortex, where spatial
resolution is highest. By contrast, inani-
mate objects, such as buildings or large
objects require a coarser representation
to allow for large-scale integration and
thus activate peripheral (medial) parts.
Although visual factors, such as retinal
topography, likely influence the categor-
ical organization of visual cortex, they3, August 13, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 285
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inanimate organization in congenitally
blind individuals. Instead, Mahon et al.’s
findings suggest additional organizing
principles of a more abstract, nonvisual
nature. Accordingly, they interpret their
findings as reflecting an innate categorical
organization of ventral visual cortex that is
part of distributed neural circuits predis-
posed to process information about
different conceptual domains. The inter-
pretation in termsof an innateorganization
at the level of conceptual domain provides
a compelling explanation for their (and
other) findings. However, other interpreta-
tions cannot as of yet be excluded. For
example, it is also possible that the organi-
zation is due to nonconceptual differences
between animate and inanimate object
categories, such as differences in the
strength of contextual associations (inani-
mate objects are generally more strongly
associated with a particular context; Bar
andAminoff, 2003), and/ormotion proper-
ties (animate objects generallymovemore
than inanimate objects, and their motion
is more often articulated; Beauchamp
et al., 2002). Importantly, however,Mahon
et al.’s results indicate that any explana-
tionwould have to be independent of input
modality, which excludes accounts that
are purely visual and favors accounts
that are formulated at a more abstract
level.
The study opens up many interesting
questions for future research. A first set
of questions concerns the extent to which
the organization of visual cortex extends
to nonvisual processing. We can discrim-
inate the orientation of a bar by touch
(orientation discrimination), hear cars
driving by (motion perception and object
identification), and locate objects in
space based on both auditory and
somatosensory information (spatial pro-286 Neuron 63, August 13, 2009 ª2009 Elsecessing). Do such tasks activate special-
ized regions in the visual cortex of
congenitally blind individuals, as they do
in the visual cortex of sighted individuals
when performing these tasks using visual
input? A second set of questions con-
cerns the specificity of this organization.
Mahon et al. (2009) found a coarse
animate-inanimate organization spann-
ing most of higher-level visual cortex.
In sighted participants, there is also
evidence for a more fine-grained func-
tional organization. For example, faces
and bodies activate nearby regions within
the lateral ‘‘animate’’ cortex (Peelen and
Downing, 2007). Is a similar fine-grained
organization evident in congenitally blind
participants? A third set of questions
concerns the functional significance of
the animate-inanimate organization in
congenitally blind people. Which behav-
iors critically rely on the animate and inan-
imate regions of visual cortex?Oneway to
test this might be to briefly disrupt neural
processing using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS; a technique that de-
livers brief electric currents through
a coil placed on the scalp). The ‘‘animate’’
region is well positioned for this technique
because of its lateral location close to the
skull. Is object recognition, or other tasks,
disproportionally impaired for animate
categories when TMS is applied? Another
way to test the functional significance of
the animate and inanimate regions might
be to relate fMRI responses to behavioral
measures on a trial-by-trial basis. Finally,
tests on the functional and anatomical
connectivity of the regions identified by
Mahon et al. (2009) would provide more
information about the networks that these
regions are part of, and about possible
connectivity differences between blind
and sighted individuals. Answers to the
above questions will provide furthervier Inc.insight in the role of visual cortex in pro-
cessing nonvisual stimuli and the extent
to which the functional organization of
visual cortex is determined by visual
experience.
In sum, the study byMahon et al. (2009)
provides evidence for an animate-inani-
mate organization in ventral visual cortex
that transcends the visual modality. The
results suggest that representations in
visual cortex may be less visual than
previously thought and challenge the
notion that the organization of the ventral
visual cortex critically depends on visual
experience.
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